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BOOK REVIEWS
Just as successful as the Committee has been with the Attorney General, the
author points out that the Committee has generally failed in its attempt to influ-
ence the Senate's role in the judicial selection process. Although the Committee,
ever since its foundation, has regularly been invited to testify concerning the
qualifications of the various candidates nominated by the President, the position
of each Senator as the guardian over all lower judicial appointments in his state
has seriously weakened the Committee's position. It is only where the Commit-
tee can produce clear-cut derogatory evidence relating to the candidate that it
will be able to block confirmation of the nomination. As an example of the
difficulty of blocking a nomination in the Senate, Professor Grossman details
the A.B.A.'s unsuccessful fight to block the highly controversial nomination of
Irving Ben Cooper for a federal judgeship in New York.
Possibly the most interesting chapter in Professor Grossman's book concerns
his detailed study of the functioning of the Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary. From painstaking research, he unfolds a clear-cut picture of who is
appointed to the Committee, the Committee's decision-making apparatus and
how it functions, and the basis behind the Committee's final judgment that a
particular candidate is or is not qualified for the federal bench.
In the preface to his work, Professor Grossman states that his book will ful-
fill his objectives if it raises more questions than it answers. In this reviewer's
opinion, the author has admirably succeeded in a most abstract and difficult
area. Beyond question, the A.B.A.'s position in an almost completely partisan
area is quite unique and unprecedented. Probably the most significant factor
presented in Professor Grossman's study is that from the time of its inception,
the A.B.A.'s Committee on the Federal Judiciary has found its greatest success
in working within the existing framework of judicial selection rather than try-
ing to make over the system according to its own political and social precepts.
Although Professor Grossman presents a strong case supporting the A.B.A.'s
position in the judicial selection process, the questions that he tries so hard to
raise do persist. For example: how strong actually is the A.B.A. in the judicial
selection process; how well has it succeeded in carrying out the original tasks
for which it was created; does it truly represent the bar in the judicial selection
process, and if not, what part should lawyers play in selecting judges; does the
information on which the A.B.A. bases its ratings of "qualified" or "not quali-
fied" clearly reflect the legal community's opinion about a particular candidate;
and what role should "politics" play in the selection of judges. For any lawyer
deeply interested in the workings of judicial selection, Professor Grossman's
book, Lawyers & Judges, is heartily recommended as a most stimulating and
thought provoking experience.
MICHAEL BERGER*
Member of the Missouri Bar. LL.B., Washington University (St. Louis), 1960.
The Govermnent as a Source of Union Power. By PHILIP Ross. Providence,
R.I.: Brown University Press, 1965. Pp. 320. $6.50.
The collective bargaining process, since it was injected into the labor-
management relations area, has had both supporters and critics. Naturally,
labor unions would support the process, and employers and employer organ-
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izations would oppose the process. However, it has been made a matter of
public policy. This is a fact of industrial life.
The collective bargaining process derives its life from the statutorily im-
posed duty to bargain. "[G]iven that it is in the public interest to promote
collective bargaining, the evidence indicates that the appropriate and effec-
tive method of accomplishing the objective is through the establishment and
enforcement of the duty to bargain."'
Not all of the proponents and opponents of this public policy have been those
directly involved in the process. Often, scholars who observe public policy
make predictions that collective bargaining is failing, and worse, is a failure.
Union-oriented scholars, however, assure the readers in their learned articles that
the process is a success and is successful. Of late, it seems there have been more
critics of the collective bargaining process whose enthusiastic condemnation
may have been set off by recent decisions of the Supreme Court in this area,
and some critics seem particularly gleeful that the wings of the N.L.R.B., the
agencies set up for the policing of the collective bargaining process, have
been trimmed by the highest court.
Mr. Harold Davey has stated this position as follows:
In summary, it can be said that the collective bargaining process is working and that
the parties in the main give evidence of a genuine concern to make it work. This
is not to say that the "creative" examples analyzed in the recent study by Healy and
others, referred to earlier, are necessarily typical. Many companies and unions do not
appear to be adopting creative or imaginative approaches to bargaining. In those cases
where traditional or conventional bargaining still seems to be in vogue, this may be
due to management concern over its cherished prerogatives or to union concern that
it may be censured for going "beyond" bread-and-butter targets. It may also be due to
the fact that the parties have not yet experienced any burning necessity to innovate
or to depart from customary procedures and policies. Collective bargaining is a prag-
matic business.2
Professors Wortman, Jr., and McCormick pointed out the following:
Today, however, as the scope of collective bargaining continues to expand, the task
of defining what is or is not bargainable (or what is a management right) has become
increasingly difficult. Since the interpretation of management rights has become an
arbitrable issue, managerial prerogatives are again beginning to arise as an important
issue in labor relations. As a result, many managers across the country are beginning to
re-examine the rights which have been conceded to the union. These rights and privi-
leges are not only being re-examined, they are being renegotiated at the bargaining
table through management demands that they be changed or dropped.3
Professor Philip Ross set out in his book to review the development of the
public policy which led to the establishment of the duty to bargain. He de-
scribes and analyzes the nature of this legal duty. He examines the effective-
ness and consequences of this policy, and evaluates the merits of contempo-
rary hostility to the duty to bargain.
Consequently, he begins with the history-the enactment of the Erdman
Act, which in 1898 made it a crime for a federal carrier to discriminate
1 Ross, THE GOVERNMENT AS A SOURCE OF UNION POWER 264 (1965).
2 Davey, The Continuing Viability of Collective Bargaining, 16 LAB. L.J. 111 (1965).
a Wortman, Jr., & McCormick, Management Rights and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 16 LAB. L.J. 195 (1965).
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against its employees for their union activities. It seems it was not so consid-
ered until the National War Labor Board and other agencies in 1917, by ex-
ecutive order, established a national policy to promote collective bargaining.
Of course, great impetus was added years later when in August, 1933, Presi-
dent Roosevelt approved the proposal of an N.R.A. Industrial and Labor Ad-
visory Board to create a National Labor Board. This board had three mem-
bers, with Senator Wagner as Chairman.
So, the author leads the reader through much history to show that there
always was fertile ground from which a public policy, enforcing a duty to
bargain between union and employer, could flower. In this historical narra-
tive, the protagonists are shown to express many fears as to the effectiveness
of the N.L.R.B. in policing this process, but as the author points out in sum-
mary, the premise of their arguments did not stand up.
The duty to bargain was a natural evolution of democratic society. In the
beginning, employers refused to deal with the representatives of workers.
This refusal was an effective brake on the growth of any labor union. The
Commission of Industrial Relations in 1916 pointed out that this refusal ren-
dered the union impotent, and by refusing to permit it to perform the func-
tions for which it was created, rendered membership in a union of doubtful
value.
It was found that the direct and proximate cause of the rioting, the looting
and the killing of the striking miners in the Southern Colorado mines was
the refusal of the operators to meet and confer with representatives of the
workers. In other words, the situation and the times called for change in
status. But many thought, at that time, that the mere compelling of the em-
ployer to confer with representatives of the workers would not guarantee
acceptance of the propositions tendered. They could all be rejected out of
hand.
Professor Ross finds it enigmatic that such scholar-professors as Taylor,
Schultz, Coleman, Gregory, Cox, Dunlop and Northrup doubt the value of
an employer statutory obligation to bargain. The author cites a statement
by Dr. Clark Kerr who, as head of a committee investigating the duty to
bargain, issued a report which stated that "[tihe efficacy of the process in
achieving a more ambitious objective-to compel the parties to bargain in
good faith-is at best doubtful."'4 Probably the scholar's doubts stem from
the dearth of knowledge of what happens after the parties have been or-
dered to bargain. One quotation puts it thus: "When the National Gadget
Company is directed to bargain with the union of its employees, is the result
one big happy family?" 5
Professor Ross finds that most of the objections stem from an assumption
that the employers would not obey the law and the courts would not confer
compliance.
This premise does not stand up according to the author, because there was
no massive defiance and no widespread evasion of legal responsibilities, and
further, the rules set down under Board law and enforced by the courts
4 Supra note I at 5; citing from COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 81-82 (1961).
5 Supra note 1 at 7; citing from Brown, The Impact of Some NLRB Decisions,
PROc INGS OF THE 13TH ANNUAL MEETING OF IRRA, publication no. 26, at 18-19 (1961).
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proved to be workable, and employers and unions did adjust their behavior
in consonance with public policy.
Presidents of the United States have probably habitually injected the au-
thority of their office into labor situations in basic industries, particularly the
steel industry. There was President Truman's action, and most recently, there
was the more suave action of President Johnson. Many hold that this is an un-
warranted interference with the theory and purpose of collective bargaining.
This action would probably not be an inconsistency under Professor Ross'
scheme.
If the book has an overriding thesis, it is that understanding of public policy
in its influence upon behavior can best be reached by examining the specific
way in which the law works. In other words, the prime method of approach
has been empirical. The author confesses an uneasiness when confronted with
generalizations about the behavior of unions and employers which are not only
inconsistent with his experience but are not supported by probative evidence.
So, it can be said that a book under the title of The Government as a
Source of Union Power may present a thesis which is not startling to anyone.
Varying opinions have already been formed, and while the book may lead
many horses to water, few will drink. The book expresses the author's rever-
ence of the institution of collective bargaining and his respect for the N.L.R.B.
which polices this area, and it is an excellent history of a facet of the large
industrial relations area.
HENRY L. STEWART*
Assistant Vice President, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
The Death Penalty in America. Edited by Hugo Adam Bedau. New York:
Doubleday, Inc., 1964. Pp. 584. $1.95.
Periodically in our country, a great debate arises on an issue which deeply
stirs the conscience of a significant part of our citizenry, numerically or intel-
lectually. So it is with the great debate regarding the preservation or abolition
of the death penalty for criminal offenses.
To assist in forming a rational, informed opinion on this subject, Hugo Adam
Bedau has compiled an impressive anthology analyzing the problem of homi-
cide. He states the arguments for and against the death penalty and marshals
the statistical and sociological evidence which would affect one's decision. The
anthology concludes with significant case histories in an attempt to graphically
emphasize the human aspect of this debate.
"[The punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word
as used in the Constitution," the Supreme Court has said.' Nevertheless, the
Court has also acknowledged that the eighth amendment to the Constitu-
tion, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, is dynamic and not
static in its meaning. In Weems v. United States,2 the Court said, "time
works changes, bringing into existence new conditions and purposes. There-
fore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth."s The question is raised, focused and analyzed
1 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 at 447 (1890).
2217 U.S. 349 (1910). 3id at 373.
